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1. INTRODUCTION
One of America’s greatest Founding Fathers, Alexander Hamilton, explained 
in the Federalist Papers why the American constitutional system requires judges 
to play an important role in our system of checks and balances and separation 
of powers. After discussing the importance of an independent judiciary, he said 
the following in Federalist No. 78:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limit-
ed Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain 
specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall 
pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this 
kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts 
of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor 
of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or priv-
ileges would amount to nothing1.
Similarly, in 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall, in the landmark case Marbury 
v. Madison2, after noting that the United States Constitution is the Supreme Law 
of the land, observed that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the Judi-
cial Department to say what the law is”3. According to both men, laws that are 
inconsistent with the Constitution have no legal effect, and judges must declare 
such legislation null and void. The point of a written Constitution is to limit what 
future government actors may do, and the only effective way to keep leaders 
within the scope of their constitutional authority is to authorize judges to enforce 
those limitations.
1 A. Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78, “Independent Journal” 1788.
2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
3 Ibidem at 177.
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There is little doubt that constitutional limitations would be ineffective, and 
the separation of powers harder to enforce, without some government institu-
tion separate from the legislature and the executive having the authority to decide 
when those two branches of government have exceeded their authority. One issue 
left unresolved by the Founding Fathers of American democracy, however, was 
how to limit the authority of judges. Judicial review makes sense when consti-
tutional limitations are clear, such as with the requirements that in the United 
States the President must by thirty-five or there must be two Senators from every 
state. But many of the United States Constitution’s most important provisions, and 
the ones that are most often litigated, involve vague commands such as the gov-
ernment may not abridge the freedom of speech, establish a religion, or deny 
to the people the equal protection of the laws or due process of law. These direc-
tives are anything but self-defining and have led to judicial resolution of some 
of the most difficult social, political, and legal issues faced by the American people. 
Abortion, affirmative action, and campaign finance reform are just three issues 
that the United States Supreme Court has largely taken away from the American 
people. It is questionable at best whether the Founding Fathers wanted judges 
to play that major a role in American politics. 
This paper focuses on what should be the appropriate role of life-tenured, une-
lected federal judges in the American system of separation of powers. The tension 
is between needing judges to enforce the supreme law of the Constitution while 
at the same time keeping judges within their assigned roles of enforcing not mak-
ing the law. Much of constitutional scholarship in the United States is devoted 
to resolving this tension. The thesis of this paper is that, absent much needed 
structural reform, which is most unlikely to occur, only a clear error rule, where 
judges don’t strike down laws unless the inconsistency between the statute and 
the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable dispute, can both allow judges to limit 
elected leaders to their constitutional responsibilities but also not transfer too 
much power to government officials who the people do not elect and who hold 
their positions for life.
1.1. THE CYCLES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Supreme Court has played many different political roles over the course 
of American history. In 1857, with the country torn apart by the issue of slavery, 
the Justices decided to enter this dangerous thicket. In the infamous Dred Scott 
case4, the Court ruled that African-Americans were not and could not be citizens 
of the United States, and Congress did not have the authority to prohibit slavery in 
the new American territories. This decision, which many scholars believe moved 
4 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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the United States much closer to civil war5, was based on questionable interpreta-
tions of text and history. More likely, the Justices in the majority thought that they 
could bring this controversial issue to a close. Ideology not law was the true basis 
for the holding, and that pattern continues to this very day.
From 1900-1936, the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated over 
200 laws pertaining to workplace issues such as minimum wages, overtime rules, 
employee safety, and child labor6. This time period, often referred to by legal 
scholars as the Lochner era, was based on the Justices’ emphasis on a laissez faire 
economic philosophy not any clear constitutional text, obvious history, or even 
prior case law. The Justices’ improper meddling into economic issues eventually 
led to President Roosevelt’s infamous “court packing” plan and possibly a polit-
ical metamorphosis by Justice Owen Roberts which became known as the “shift 
in time that saved nine”7. Whether or not the political pressure of the plan led 
to Roberts’ shift, eventually new Justices appointed by Roosevelt overturned 
much of the Lochner era case law not because they discovered new constitutional 
evidence but because they held substantially different political views.
Beginning in the early 1960’s, the Warren Court (and later the early Burger 
Court) unleashed a torrent of important personal rights decisions which dramati-
cally altered the American political landscape. The Court promulgated constitu-
tional rules regarding voting rights, defamation, abortion, free speech, the free 
exercise of religion and a series of cases protecting the rights of criminal defend-
ants and limiting police practices. This era didn’t last long but it did fundamen-
tally alter America’s constitutional landscape8. 
What is perhaps most interesting about these decisions is that in many of them 
the Court did not try hard to justify overturning longstanding state and federal 
laws through a careful review of constitutional text and history or even prior 
Supreme Court decisions. For example, Justice Douglas’ plurality opinion in 
the landmark case Griswold v. Connecticut striking down a state ban on contra-
ceptive use, and finding a constitutional right to privacy that would later be used 
by the Court in Roe v. Wade, is only six pages long9. Similarly, the Court’s opin-
ion in Brandenburg v. Ohio, which set forth the fundamental test for determin-
ing whether inflammatory speech (in that case, racist epithets) is constitutionally 
protected is only five pages long without any mention of the First Amendment’s 
original meaning10. For more than a decade, the Court issued major constitutional 
 5 See P. Finkelman, S. V. Sandford, The Court’s Most Dreadful Case and How It Changed 
History, ”Chicago-Kent Law Review” 2007, Vol. 82, No. 3.
 6 See S. A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 
“North Carolina Law Review” 1991, Vol. 70.
 7 See https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/west-coast-hotels-place- in-american-constitu-
tional-history (visited February 25, 2019).
 8 See E. Segall, Originalism as Faith, New York 2018.
 9 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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decisions with “no coherent jurisprudence ‘apart from the results reached’”11. 
The Justices were much more concerned with their own ideological notions 
of fairness, justice, and equality, than legal reasoning, just as was true during 
the Lochner era, albeit with substantially different values at play.
There was a major backlash to the Warren Court’s liberal decisions among 
scholars, judges, and politicians. Although this criticism often came in the form 
of accusing the Court of not focusing on the “original intent” or “original mean-
ing” of the Constitution12, the true source of the critic’s displeasure was ideo-
logical and political disagreement with the results reached by the Court. This 
disconnect became obvious when, after twelve years of federal court judges and 
Supreme Court Justices appointed by Republican Presidents Ronald Reagan and 
George H.W. Bush, a new conservative Supreme Court also paid little attention 
to text and history while aggressively striking down laws based on a different 
set of values. Starting around 1995, the Court strongly favored states rights, lim-
ited or reversed many Warren Court precedents protecting defendants’ rights, 
applied strict scrutiny to affirmative action, used the first amendment to over-
turn commercial speech laws, cut back on voting rights, and maybe most impor-
tantly overturned a series of campaign finance reform laws13. Again, what was 
at play in these cases was values and politics, not prior positive law, such as text 
and history.
The history of the Supreme Court of the United States can be divided into 
different eras of judicial review depending on the political make-up of the Court. 
As I’ve written elsewhere, in virtually every area of litigated constitutional law, 
the relevant legal doctrine has changed dramatically over the years while the text 
and history of the Constitution has stayed the same14. Given the open-ended 
nature of most litigated constitutional text, the reasonable debates over the Con-
stitution’s original meaning, and the Supreme Court’s discretion to reverse its 
own decisions whenever it feels doing so is necessary, it is not surprising that 
the Court’s decisions reflect the Justices’ personal and political values much more 
than prior positive law.
11 J. O’Neil, Originalism in American Law and Politics, The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2005 (quoting L. A. Powe Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics, Cambridge 2000, 
pp. 214-215).
12 See R. H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, ”Indiana Law 
Journal” 1971, Vol. 47, No. 1.
13 See M. A. Graber, Does It Really Matter? Conservative Courts in a Conservative Era, 
“Fordham Law Review” 2006, Vol. 75, pp. 675-708.
14 See E. J. Segall, Constitutional Change and The Supreme Court: The Article V Problem, 
”The University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law” 2013, Vol. 16.
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1.2. HOW TO LIMIT THE JUSTICES’ OVERSIZED POWER 
AND INFLUENCE
American law reviews and scholarly books discussing the Supreme Court 
are full of theoretical models designed to limit the power of the Justices. These 
efforts to devise theoretical or intellectual pre-commitments to cabin the judicial 
discretion of the Justices have so far been wholly unsuccessful. As most political 
scientists agree, the Justices decide hard constitutional cases based on their own 
politics, values and life experiences, not prior legal rules15.
One way to weaken the Court and make it more responsive to the law would be 
to reform how the Court operates. In the wake of the confirmation of Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh, giving conservatives a solid five vote majority on the Court, many 
liberal law professors in the United States have set forth proposals to restructure 
the Court. These suggestions include ending life tenure16, requiring a super-ma-
jority vote to overturn laws17, and even stripping the Court of jurisdiction over 
various controversial areas of constitutional law18.
Weakening the Court just because of its current political make-up is wrong-
headed. The United States should restructure the Supreme Court not because it is 
too conservative, too liberal, or even too moderate. The Court simply wields far 
too much power and influence regardless of which political side benefits from its 
decisions19. Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that any of these reforms will ever 
take place.
Another method of limiting the Court’s power would be for the Justices 
to return to the original rationale for judicial review which included a strong pre-
sumption in favor of legislation. In Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton, in 
response to concerns by people opposed to the very idea of judicial review, said 
that the Court would only overturn laws when there is in “irreconcilable variance” 
between the challenged statute and the Constitution20. Additionally, early state 
and federal cases suggest strongly that, unless the judiciary’s power was directly 
at stake, such as with jury or evidentiary issues, the Founding Fathers expected 
judges to only interfere with the decisions of more accountable governmental 
15 See H. J. Spaeth, J. A. Segall, Majority Rule or Minority Will: Adherence to Precedent on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, New York 1999.
16 See https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/opinion/columnists/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-
court-term-limits.html (visited February 26, 2019).
17 See https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2018/10/recusal-practice-in-the-supreme-
court.html (visited February 26, 2019).
18 See https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/supreme-court-kavanaugh-gorsuch_us_5b-
f806e3e4b0771fb6b8489a (visited February 26, 2019).
19 See https://www.salon.com/2018/12/04/its-time-to-reform-the-supreme-court-but-not-for-
the-wrong-reasons/ (visited February 26, 2019).
20 A. Hamilton, The Federalist…
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officials in cases where the constitutional violation amounted to clear error21. 
The men who wrote and ratified the Constitution never intended the Supreme 
Court to play the role of the ultimate guardian of the country’s moral choices 
on issues where the Constitution does not speak clearly. Where reasonable peo-
ple can disagree over the constitutional validity of laws voted on by the people’s 
representatives, the Constitution’s original meaning dictated that judges stay out 
of the political thicket22. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has for over a century 
played a much different and more active role in America’s politics.
As I’ve written elsewhere, over the last century or so, the Court has imposed 
its will on a plethora of difficult policy decisions even though text and history did 
not clearly call for the Court to strike down the legislation. The Court at one time 
or another has “invalidated laws pertaining to minimum wages, overtime rules, 
child labor, abortion, affirmative action, campaign finance reform, gay rights/
same-sex marriage, how states carve up voting districts, pure commercial speech, 
aid to religious schools, religious symbols on government property, and speech 
rules in schools and government offices”23.
The problems with unelected, life-tenured judges having so much authority 
to dictate answers to these kinds of questions are well-documented. Replacing 
political debate and legislative efforts to achieve consensus with judicial edicts 
from nine judges in the nation’s Capitol makes it harder to achieve compromise 
among warring sides and elevates the Supreme Court nomination process to an 
importance that affects elections and distorts normal politics. Justice Antonin 
Scalia, who throughout his career voted to overturn law after law even where 
text and history did not justify those results24, nevertheless described accurately 
the problems with the Court’s overly aggressive acts of judicial review:
As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices were doing 
essentially lawyers’ work up here – reading text and discerning our society’s tradi-
tional understanding of that text – the public pretty much left us alone. Texts and tra-
ditions are facts to study, not convictions to demonstrate about. But if in reality our 
process of constitutional adjudication consists primarily of making value judgments, 
then a free and intelligent people’s attitude towards us can be expected to be (ought 
to be) quite different. The people know that their value judgments are quite as good 
as those taught in any law school – maybe better. If, indeed, the “liberties” protected 
by the Constitution are, as the Court says, undefined and unbounded, then the people 
should demonstrate, to protest that we do not implement their values instead of ours. 
Not only that, but confirmation hearings for new Justices should deteriorate into qu-
21 See E. Segall, Originalism as Faith…, pp. 15-25.
22 See E. Segall, Judicial Engagement, New Originalism, and the Fortieth Anniversary of 
Government by Judiciary, “Fordham Law Review Online” 2017, Vol. 86.
23 See https://www.salon.com/2018/12/04/its-time-to-reform-the-supreme-court-but-not-for-
the-wrong-reasons/ (visited February 26, 2019).
24 See E. J. Segall, The Constitution According to Justices Scalia and Thomas: Alive and 
Kickin’, “Washington University Law Review” 2014, Vol. 91.
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estion and answer sessions in which Senators go through a list of their constituents’ 
most favored and most disfavored alleged constitutional rights, and seek the nomi-
nee’s commitment to support or oppose them. Value judgments, after all, should be 
voted on, not dictated25.
It is not impossible to imagine a system or tradition of judicial review wherein 
the Supreme Court does not invalidate laws absent clear and convincing evidence 
that the challenged statute violates the Untied States Constitution. Since 1936, 
the Justices have applied a highly deferential rational basis test to run-of-the-mill 
economic legislation that did not implicate other textual constitutional limita-
tions. Although some argue that this test may be too deferential and amounts 
to an automatic rubber-stamping of state and federal laws26, this model of deci-
sion-making applied to the entire Constitution, perhaps strengthened just a bit, 
would take the Court out of normal politics and return it to the role envisioned 
by the founding fathers as a bulwark against only clear constitutional violations.
Similarly, when federal appellate judges review the factual findings of lower 
courts, they are only allowed to review such findings under a “clearly erroneous” 
standard of review27. This standard works well in practice and leads to very few 
trial court factual conclusions being overturned on appeal by appellate judges. 
Of course, no legal standard can guard against bad-faith judging but an assump-
tion of good faith is implicit in any democratic legal system. This kind of clearly 
erroneous standard applied to the validity of state and federal laws would still deter 
obvious constitutional violations but would substantially decrease the Court’s abil-
ity to invalidate laws they do not like when their only basis for doing so is political 
disagreement with other more accountable governmental officials.
The political nature of the Court’s present decision-making process is taking 
a serious toll on the American political system. Exit polls taken after the 2016 
Presidential election showed that “seven in 10 voters nationwide say Supreme 
Court appointments were either the most important factor or an important factor 
in their decision to support a candidate”28. Additionally, 21% of voters said that 
the future of the Supreme Court was the reason they voted for one candidate or 
the other, and 57% of those voters preferred Donald Trump (even though Trump 
lost the popular vote)29. Elections should be about economics, foreign policy, 
social and cultural issues, and leadership, not nine unelected, life-tenured judges. 
The reality, however, is that the American people know that the Supreme Court 
25 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26 See C. Neily, No More Make-Believe Judging, “George Mason Law Review” 2012, Vol. 19.
27 See K. Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, “Seattle University Law 
Review” 1994, Vol. 18.
28 https://www.nbcnews.com/card/nbc-news-exit-poll-future-supreme-court-appointments-
important-factor-n680381 (visited February 27, 2019).
29 https://www.vox.com/2018/6/29/17511088/scotus-2016-election-poll-trump-republicans-
kennedy-retire (visited February 27, 2019).
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will have the final say over the kinds of issues elections should be fought over 
even when the Constitution does not favor one resolution or another concerning 
those issues. That document is silent about abortion, affirmative action, campaign 
spending by big corporations and many other issues the Court has taken away 
from more democratic political processes. A more deferential standard of review 
is sorely needed to return the Court to its proper place of enforcing the Constitu-
tion’s real limits on governmental power not the imaginary and largely unwritten 
Constitution that authorizes the Court to resolve many of America’s most impor-
tant and controversial public policy questions based on politics and personal val-
ues not constitutional text and history.
2. CONCLUSIONS
The Supreme Court of the United States is by far the most powerful judicial 
institution in the free world. The Justices of that Court are the only high court 
judges in any Democracy to have life tenure. The Justices for the most part select 
their own cases and define their own workload. And, they are currently part of a 
long tradition of overturning state and federal laws even when the alleged con-
stitutional violation is far from clear. The combination of all these factors has 
led to a political system where judges play too important a role in the resolution 
of controversial and important policy issues. It is one thing for judges to over-
turn laws clearly in conflict with written constitutional limitations on government 
behavior. It is quite another thing, however, for judges to invalidate the decisions 
of elected and more accountable government officials and voters based on the per-
sonal values, politics, and experiences of the judges, not the rule of law.
There are two possible ways to limit the damage caused by an overly aggres-
sive Court. One is to put in place structural reforms to weaken the institution 
itself. Most of the recent suggested reforms, however, such as imposing term lim-
its, or requiring two-thirds of the Justices to agree before a law would be struck 
down, would likely take a constitutional amendment which in the United States 
requires a super-majority of both Congress and the states and is therefore highly 
unlikely to happen.
Another possible solution to the problem of judicial overreaching is to select 
more deferential judges or perhaps even by political protest or even an unwill-
ingness on the part of politicians or the people to obey Supreme Court decisions. 
The mere threat of the latter might just encourage the former. If something does 
not encourage more humble, modest, and deferential judicial review in the near 
future, the United States may well find itself in the midst of a constitutional crisis.
76 ERIC J. SEGALL
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Summary
For over one-hundred and fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has been 
the most powerful judicial body in the world with life-tenured judges consistently 
invalidating state and federal laws without clear support in constitutional text or history. 
This paper focuses on what should be the appropriate role of life-tenured, unelected 
federal judges in the American system of separation of powers. The tension is between 
wanting judges to enforce the supreme law of the Constitution while at the same time 
keeping judges within their assigned roles of enforcing not making the law. Much 
of constitutional scholarship in the United States is devoted to resolving this tension. 
This article argues that the Court should take a set back and defer more to elected leaders 
and voters. Although structural reform might help, most needed changes would require 
a constitutional amendment and are therefore unlikely to occur. The Justices should take 
it upon themselves to act with more humility and modesty and only overturn laws where 
there is strong evidence of clear constitutional error.
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Streszczenie
Od ponad stu pięćdziesięciu lat Sąd Najwyższy Stanów Zjednoczonych jest najpo-
tężniejszym organem sądowniczym na świecie, złożonym z sędziów mianowanych na 
całe życie, którzy są uprawnieni do tego, aby podważać przepisy stanowe i federalne bez 
wyraźnego umocowania w tekście konstytucji lub w zwyczajach. Niniejszy artykuł kon-
centruje się na tym, jaka powinna być rola sędziów federalnych, nie pochodzących z wy-
borów. Autor argumentuje, że Sąd Najwyższy Stanów Zjednoczonych powinien zrobić 
krok do tyłu i oprzeć się bardziej na wyborcach oraz liderach pochodzących z wyborów. 
Mimo, że reforma strukturalna Sądu Najwyższego byłaby pomocna, to najbardziej po-
trzebne zmiany wymagałyby zmian tekstu konstytucji, a zatem są mało prawdopodobne 
do przeprowadzenia. Sędziowie powinni podjąć działania z większą pokorą i skrom-
nością, a prawo zmieniać jedynie tam, gdzie istnieją mocne dowody wyraźnego błędu 
konstytucyjnego
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE
Sąd Najwyższy Stanów Zjednoczonych, prawo konstytucyjne, interpretacja 
konstytucji
